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1 Introduction
Diversification is a fundamental concept in a wide variety of fields, such as financial economics, de-
cision theory, sociology, consumer theory, economic growth, genetics and evolution. From a broad
perspective, it conveys the idea of introducing variety to a set of objects by not putting all of one’s
proverbial eggs into one basket. This is a paradigm which goes as far back as the Talmud (ca. 200
CE), which states that “it is advisable for one that he should divide his money in three parts, one of
which he shall invest in real estate, one of which in business, and the third part to remain always in
his hands.” In an economic context, Bernoulli (1738) may have been the first to formally argue for the
benefits of diversification. In his fundamental 1738 article on the St. Petersburg paradox, Bernoulli
(1738) argues by example that risk averse investors will want to diversify: “Another rule which may
prove useful can be derived from our theory. This is the rule that it is advisable to divide goods which
are exposed to some danger into several portions rather than to risk them all together.” But perhaps
the most prominent conceptual theory of diversification is that of Darwin (1859), who introduced the
idea that a greater diversity of life forms is conducive to a greater level of functioning and higher
evolutionary fitness level.
Today, there is general consensus that some form of diversification is beneficial in an array of seem-
ingly disparate contexts: variety-seeking is typical of consumer behavior, diversity improves growth,
innovation, and competition, and diversified choices provide a buffer against future uncertainty. More-
over, desirability for diversification is a cornerstone of a broad range of decision making and portfolio
choice models in economics and finance, lead by the seminal works of von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944) and Markowitz (1952). However, the views of what constitutes diversification in decision
making in general and in portfolio choice in particular differ substantially, and the way in which
diversification is interpreted and implemented in the real world varies greatly. Indeed, there is an
ongoing debate about what the “best” level of diversification should be. There is also a recent trend
of evaluating certain diversifying heuristics as being “anomalous” and “irrational” behavior. It is
documented that even Harry Markowitz used the simple 1/n naive diversification heuristic when he
made his own retirement investments. He justifies his choice on psychological grounds: “My intention
was to minimize my future regret. So I split my contributions fifty-fifty between bonds and equities.”
(Gigerenzer 2010)
The purpose of this paper is to initiate and contribute to the discussion of the foundations of di-
versification preferences. We ask how elementary the notion of diversification is by studying whether
children apply it as a choice heuristic in a sequence of games replicating simple portfolio choice prob-
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lems. If children exhibit an intrinsic preference for diversification, we also investigate the particular
form of diversification they apply and whether there is a relationship between risk aversion and pref-
erence for diversification.
There are numerous reasons to study the mechanisms that underlie decision making in humans:
to make better predictions about how people will act in the real world, to generate new hypotheses
about the factors that lead to human irrationalities, and to create or refine economic policy based on
evidence. Complementing these, there are two elements — foundational and practical — to why the
question of whether diversification in particular is an elementary, and perhaps intrinsic, behavioral
trait is an important one to address. From a foundational perspective, an understanding of the
development of diversification preferences may help us gain insights into behavioral diversification
heuristics and biases in adults, and may thus yield insights into understanding where such widely
documented human behavior is coming from. Indeed, many other behavioral heuristics, such as
selfishness, cooperation and risk aversion, have been argued as being elementary and perhaps intrinsic
to human nature. Moreover, diversifying behavior known as bet-hedging has been widely documented
in other species (Hopper 1999, Olofsson, Ripa, and Jonze´n 2009, Starrfelt and Kokko 2012, Rajon,
Desouhant, Chevalier, Debias, and Menu 2014, Ackerman, Maner, and Carpenter 2016). We therefore
ask whether the ability to choose diversification over concentration for the purpose of mitigating
uncertainty is something that is universally present and hence an elementary intuition that exists at a
very young age, or whether it only appears at adulthood. Studying diversification in children, whose
cognitive and emotional development is still in progress, thus highly variable and unaffected by formal
theoretic or financial schooling, offers great promise for a better understanding of diversification biases
in the investment universe. In particular, what modern theory postulates as being an anomalous or
irrational portfolio choice may have pre-wired developmental roots explaining where these tendencies
are coming from. Furthermore, it can support a new theoretical foundation for the so far empirically
focused investigation of diversification. Moreover, understanding how broadly any diversification
related bias manifests itself may influence how one should incorporate them into more adequate
models of individual decision making and portfolio choice models. In terms of practical impact,
several factors may render this paper’s insights valuable. First, empirical evidence shows that children
and adolescents influence to a large extent many household decisions and that, over the past few
decades, their purchasing power has increased substantially, at least in highly developed countries
(McNeal 1992, Dauphin, El Lahga, Fortin, and Lacroix 2011). Second, now that the costs of entering
the stock market have fallen, more individuals are investing in the market with no clear understanding
3
of how to diversify or manage risk. Third, the worldwide trend toward defined contribution retirement
savings plans (Benartzi and Thaler 2001, Benartzi and Thaler 2013), and the possibility of individual
accounts in social security systems mean that individuals are more responsible for their own financial
well-being in retirement. It is therefore natural to ask how well they are handling these tasks and
understand the behavioral drivers that lead them to certain choices. In terms of concrete applications,
the suggestion that some amount of our diversifying behavior has an elementary component may have
implications for how one can treat these diversification tendencies. For example, if a diversification
bias such as the naive diversification heuristic has deep developmental roots, this may lead us to believe
that it will persist in a variety of settings, will be stable across time, ages and cultures, and may endure
even in the face of repeated financial disciplining. This could constrain the potential for successful
policy intervention, but could also support the idea of financial literacy training to non-professionals
from a very young age, which is a popular ongoing debate (see for example Huston 2010, van Rooij,
Lusardi, and Alessie 2011, Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi 2011, Brown and Graf 2013).
In this paper, we report on results of an experiment that tests whether children apply the diver-
sification heuristic in a sequence of hypothetical choice questions and simple dice-rolling games. We
studied 76 primary school children across the first six school grades. We described the experiment
as a scientific research project that studies decision making in children and carried it out without
revealing its purpose. The hypothetical choice questions test for whether children would diversify
when faced with a number of different types of candy. They address the proverb that variety is the
spice of life, the notion that decision makers diversify across consumption goods simply for the sake
of attaining diversity. The purpose of the dice-rolling games is to replicate risky assets in a primitive
portfolio choice problem and to test for whether children diversify in order to mitigate uncertainty. In
its simplest form, an asset is represented by a die whose rolling outcome represents either a loss or a
gain to the child. We study how children would allocate a number of coupons, which can be exchanged
for candy later on, to different colours on various dice. A diversifying child would not allocate all of
their coupons to one die outcome but would spread the risk across different outcomes. Because of the
standard hypothesis in financial economics stating that risk averse investors would prefer to diversify,
we also examine the children’s risk attitudes and their relationship to diversification preferences.
This experiment is to our knowledge the first study of children’s financial decision making in the
context of diversification and portfolio choice. It is designed as a simple, unsophisticated elicitation of
diversification in terms of familiar dice-rolling games, and hence requires no ability to forecast risky
outcomes, no rigorous understanding of probability, and no familiarity with financial decision mak-
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ing. On the other hand, most of the experimental and empirical studies of diversification in adults
are about violations of traditional paradigms, and do not address the intrinsic nature of diversifi-
cation. Our results indicate that diversification preferences may have fundamental, developmental
roots. Overall, we find that children do exhibit preferences for diversification, both for the sake of
diversity across unknown consumption goods and for the purpose of mitigating risk and uncertainty
when faced with a choice across risky gambles. The naive diversification heuristic, which implies an
equal allocation across alternatives, is particularly evident in children’s choices, but only when the un-
derlying alternatives are equivalent or unknown. When there is a clear ranking of one alternative over
another, children tend to apply a probability matching strategy and thus maximize (risk-adjusted)
payoff. Moreover, unlike what traditional financial and economic theory stipulates, we find no sig-
nificant relationship between risk aversion and diversification. This lack of correlation between risk
aversion and diversification has previously been observed in experiments involving the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) (Bossaerts, Plott, and Zane 2007). However, when the risk-payoff profiles of
gambles differ, there is a difference between risk averse and risk seeking children in their allocation.
Our findings provide the following two insights. First, diversification may be an elementary be-
havioral decision mechanism that did not necessarily and exclusively arise because of a sophisticated
understanding of the optimal way to process information in a portfolio choice problem; rather, prefer-
ence for diversification may be a fundamental pre-wired heuristic that helps us make decisions about
standalone versus combined choices. Second, despite the fact our experiment participants were never
exposed to formal financial literacy training, children as young as primary school age seem to act in a
rational manner when making decisions on allocating wealth to risky gambles. These two insights may
have implications for how one can treat, and perhaps prevent, portfolio choice anomalies in adults in
practice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the relevant back-
ground of the theory of diversification preferences and risk aversion, with a focus on the portfolio choice
problem. Section 3 reviews relevant previous experiments investigating diversification, risk attitudes
and decision making under uncertainty in adults and children. Section 4 explains our experimental
design and procedure, and Section 5 discusses our results. We conclude in Section 6 by examining the
implications of our findings.
5
2 Theory
The starting point of our analysis is traditional financial decision making, where an individual who
chooses to diversify is roughly understood to prefer variety over similarity. We adopt the model-
independent definition of Dekel (1989), according to which a preference relation % on a convex set
of choices X exhibits preference for diversification if for any finite collection of choice alternatives
x1, . . . , xn ∈ X and weights α1, . . . , αn ∈ [0, 1] satisfying
∑n
i=1 αi = 1, we have
x1 ∼ · · · ∼ xn ⇒
n∑
i=1
αi xi % xj for all j = 1, . . . , n. (1)
An individual will hence want to diversify among a collection of choice alternatives all of which are
equivalently ranked. This model-independent notion of diversification corresponds exactly to that of
convexity of preferences, which states that for any pair of choice alternatives x, y ∈ X , αx+(1−α) y %
y, for all α ∈ [0, 1], if x % y. This represents the idea that averages are better than extremes, which
roughly corresponds to the concept of diminishing marginal utility without requiring utility functions.
Convex preferences with their associated convex indifference maps arise from quasi-concave utility
functions, although these are not necessary for the analysis of preferences.
The most common example of diversification preferences is within the universe of asset markets,
where an investor faces a choice amongst risky positions, such as equities, derivatives, or portfolios.
Such risky positions are usually modeled as random variables on some state space Ω under a given
objective reference probability P. Diversification across two equivalently ranked risky assets x and y
is then expressed by the state-wise convex combination αx(ω) + (1− α) y(ω) for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω
and α ∈ [0, 1]. In this context, preference for diversification means that an investor would prefer to
allocate a fraction α to asset x and a fraction 1 − α to asset y rather than fully invest in either one
of the assets.
There are broadly two hypotheses for why individuals exhibit preference for diversification. The
first relates to choice among consumption goods, where decision makers tend to diversify because
they simply prefer “variety for the sake of variety” (Middleton 1987). There are three main rea-
sons proposed in the literature for why consumers prefer variety (Kahn 1995): (i) for satiation and
stimulation; (ii) as a result of external factors such as price changes; and (iii) because of preference
uncertainty. Experimental evidence also shows that variety-seeking often leads consumers to choose
a larger number of alternatives even when some of the alternatives chosen are not among the most
preferred (Ratner, Kahn, and Kahneman 1999). The second hypothesis for the purpose of diversifying
is summarized by the proverb of not putting all of one’s eggs into one basket. This stipulates that
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decision makers introduce variety to a set of alternatives whose outcomes are uncertain. Diversifying
here is thus a strategy for risk mitigation. Indeed, in expected utility theory (EUT) of von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944), preference for diversification is equivalent to the concavity of the utility
function, which in turn is equivalent to risk aversion (see De Giorgi and Mahmoud 2016). Therefore,
under EUT, diversification is preferred because it leads to a reduction of “risk” or “uncertainty”.
The same reasoning applies to Markowitz’s (1952) mean-variance preferences. Consider the prob-
lem of investing in two risky assets with random payoffs x and y, with expected returns µx and µy,
volatilities σx > 0 and σy > 0, respectively, and correlation ρ 6= 1. The diversifying decision maker
invests α of his wealth in asset x and the remaining 1−α in asset y, implying an overall portfolio payoff
of z = αx+ (1−α) y. The goal of mean-variance decision makers is to optimize the tradeoff between










where µz = αµx + (1−α)µy, σ2z = α2 σ2x + 2α (1−α) ρ σx σy + (1−α)2 σ2y, and γ > 0 is the coefficient
of risk (volatility) aversion. Solving Problem 2, the optimal weight of asset x corresponds to
α? =
(µx − µy)− γ2 (2 ρ σx σy − 2σ2y)
γ (σ2x − 2 ρ σx σy + σ2y)
.





µz − γ2 σ2z
)
> 0, which in turn implies that the
mean-variance decision maker prefers to diversify when either risk decreases or when additional risk is
fully compensated by a larger expected return (for example when µx > µy and ρ ≤ 0, independently
from σx and σy). Consequently, among two portfolios with the same expected return, the mean-
variance investor prefers diversification if and only if the portfolio’s overall risk is lowered.
Three special cases are worth emphasizing in this context. First, when x and y are equally ranked
by the mean-variance decision maker, i.e., µx − γ2 σ2x = µy − γ2 σ2y, then
α? = 1− α? = 1
2
independently from the coefficient of risk aversion γ and the correlation ρ. This means that if two
assets are equally preferred, they are equally weighted regardless of their correlation, a fact first proven











The case of perfect negative correlation between two assets is particularly interesting, because it offers
the highest risk diversification potential to mean-variance decision makers. Indeed, when x and y are
perfectly negatively correlated, then y = a x + b almost surely for some a < 0 and b ∈ R. Therefore,
the portfolio payoff is
z = αx+ (1− α) y = (α (1− a) + a)x+ (1− α) b,
and with α = a




This means that risk has been fully diversified away. In our experiment, we mainly impose ρ = −1
and σx = σy, implying α
? ≥ 1
2
when µx ≥ µy, and α? ↘ 12 when γ ↗ ∞. In other words, if the
individual payoffs of two assets have perfect negative correlation and identical volatilities, the mean-
variance investor aims to achieve a higher portfolio expected payoff by investing a higher proportion in
the asset with higher expected payoff. However, as volatility aversion increases, the optimal strategy
converges to α? = 1
2
, which fully diversifies risk away. The third special case deals with zero correlation
(ρ = 0). Here, x and y are linearly independent, and then
α? =
µx − µy










Again, if ρ = 0, σx = σy, then α
? ≥ 1
2
for µx ≥ µy, and α? ↘ 12 when γ ↗∞ for µx ≥ µy.
Finally this paper also addresses the naive diversification paradigm, one of the most widely ap-
plied simple rules of choice. It stipulates that a decision maker allocates equal weights, i.e., αi = αj
for all i, j, among a given choice set, independent of the individual characteristics of the underlying
choice alternatives. In the context of portfolio selection, naive diversification is often referred to as the
equal-weighted or 1/n diversification strategy and has been shown to deliver superior risk-adjusted per-
formance relative to optimised portfolios (DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal 2007). Empirical evidence
shows that in the real world people typically do not always diversify according to EUT preferences
or mean-variance preferences. By contrast, they apply the naive diversification paradigm. Naive di-
versification preferences have been studied from a theoretic perspective in De Giorgi and Mahmoud
(2017). Here, naive diversification is framed as a preference for equality over inequality, which has a
utility representation via Schur-concave functions (Schur 1923), capturing the idea of being inequality
averse on top of being risk averse. The notion of permutation invariance lies at the core of the naive
diversification axiom. Permutation invariance represents the attitude that the underlying character-
istics of the individual choices are irrelevant in the decision making process, which formally means
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that the decision maker is indifferent towards a permutation of the components α1, . . . , αn of the
choice vectors. Naive diversification preferences could also arise in the case that a decision maker does
not have any reason to favour one choice alternative to another. For example, as discussed above,
mean-variance decision makers assign equal weights to assets that are equivalently ranked. One of the
earliest related hypotheses is the principle of insufficient reason, also called the principle of indiffer-
ence. It is generally attributed to Bernoulli (1738) and invoked by Bayes (1763) in his development
of the binomial theorem. The principle states that in situations where there is no logical or empirical
reason to favor any one of a set of mutually exclusive choices over any other, one should assign them
all equal probability. In Bayesian probability, this is the simplest non-informative prior. Overall,
the naive diversification paradigm, when applied to alternatives that are not equivalent, continues
to be viewed as a simple and practical rule of thumb with no economic foundation guaranteeing its
optimality. It inherently implies a lack of sophistication and is widely viewed as an anomaly linked to
irrational behavior. The underlying rationale for naively diversifying across a set of assets is generally
conjectured to be lack of sophistication, complexity reduction, correlation neglect, limited financial
literacy, probability neglect, effects of cognitive load and attentional biases. Under these behavioral
and cognitive heuristics, the decision maker is essentially simplifying the problem by assuming that
the underlying alternatives are all equivalent, and thus they are being assigned equal probabilities.
3 Related experiments
Experimental studies on diversification in the past have focused on naive diversification viewed as an
“investment anomaly.” Some of the first academic demonstrations of naive diversification as a decision
making paradigm were made by Simonson (1990) in marketing in the context of consumption decisions
by individuals, and by Read and Loewenstein (1995) in the context of experimental psychology. In
the context of economic and financial decision making, experimental evidence suggests behavior which
is consistent with naive diversification. For instance, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) study whether the
effect manifests itself among individuals choosing their personal defined contribution saving plans.
Their experimental evidence suggests that some people spread their contributions evenly across the
investment options irrespective of the particular mix of options. The authors point out that while
naive diversification can produce a “reasonable portfolio”, it affects the resulting asset allocation and
can be costly. In particular, people might choose a portfolio that is not on the efficient frontier, or they
might pick the wrong point along the frontier. Subsequently, Huberman and Jiang (2006) find that
participants tend to invest in only a small number of the funds offered to them, and that they tend to
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allocate their contributions evenly across the funds that they use, with this tendency weakening with
the number of funds used. More recently, Baltussen and Post (2011) find strong evidence for what they
coin as irrational diversification. Their subjects follow a conditional naive diversification heuristic as
they exclude assets with an unattractive marginal distribution and divide the available funds equally
between the remaining, attractive assets. This strategy is applied even if it leads to allocations that
are dominated in terms of first-order stochastic dominance – hence the term irrational. Irrationality
has been since then frequently used to describe naive diversification behavior. In Fernandes (2013),
the naive diversification bias of Benartzi and Thaler (2001) was replicated across different samples
using a within-participant manipulation of portfolio options. It was found that the more investors use
intuitive judgments, the more likely they are to display the naive diversification bias. In the context
of portfolio construction, naive diversification has enjoyed a revival during recent years because of its
simplicity and the growing empirical evidence suggesting superior performance compared to traditional
diversification schemes (Lessard 1976, Roll 1981, Ohlson and Rosenberg 1982, Breen, Glosten, and
Jagannathan 1989, Grinblatt and Titman 1989, Korajczyk and Sadka 2004, Hamza, Kortas, L’Her, and
Roberge 2007, Pae and Sabbaghi 2010, DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal 2007, Duchin and Levy 2009).
This rather surprising superiority is often explained by the fact that undervalued low-risk assets receive
more weight in the naive allocation.
The vast majority of experimental research in diversification and decision making has been con-
ducted with adults rather than children. Much less is yet known about how diversification preferences
develop with age, in particular before adults enter working life and face crucial decisions regarding
for example their retirement investment. In the context of economic decision making in general, pi-
oneering work of Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001) investigates rationality of children’s revealed
preferences, children’s risk aversion and risk attitudes (Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry 2001), and their
trust and trust-worthiness (Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund 2003). Other-regarding preferences,
selfishness and cooperation have also been studied extensively in experiments on children (see for exam-
ple Murnighan and Saxon 1998, Benenson, Pascoe, and Radmore 2007, Sutter and Kocher 2007, Fehr,
Bernhard, and Rockenbach 2008, Fehr, Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler, and Sutter 2013), where the overall evidence
suggests that humans become less selfish as they grow older.
In another strand of academic research, experiments that aim at capturing children’s cognitive
capabilities of understanding risk, monetary rewards, uncertainty and probabilities have been carried
out extensively in the child development and cognitive psychology literature, lead by seminal works of
Marks (1951) and Slovic (1966), who study children’s decision making when faced with risky choices.
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In particular, early experimental work indicates that children exhibit a mature understanding of
probabilities only in the stage of formal operations (Piaget and Inhelder 1975). More recent work
confirms that children as young as 5 or 6 years old show a firm understanding of probabilities and
expected value (Schlottmann 2001, Tsakiridou and Vavyla 2015) and that they are able to evaluate
gains and losses in gambles (Levin and Hart 2003). These studies contribute to the growing evidence
on children’s overall intuitive reasoning competence and their relative probabilistic sophistication.
Based on this evidence taken collectively, we thus contend that models of behavior in a financial
economics context can work about as well for children as they do for adults and can be experimentally
tested in a similar manner. Financial diversification models in particular assume rational individuals
with unlimited wants but limited resources and an understanding of the notion of risk. There is little
argument about the extent of children’s wants or resources, and the extensive literature dedicated
to studying children’s cognitive ability indicates that they are able to make rational decisions when
faced with uncertainty. This supports the idea of an experiment eliciting children’s diversification
preferences among risky gambles, whose outcomes are probabilistic yet with real payoffs, such as in
the form of popular consumption goods. Our precise experimental design replicating a portfolio choice
problem is described next.
4 Experimental design
4.1 Design
Participants engaged in two parts with increasing complexity. Given the young audience, the experi-
ment’s two parts were not randomized, as the simpler questions of Part 1 were designed as a reasonable
start for all participants.
Part 1. Part 1 consisted of four questions (Q1–Q4). In each question, we asked the participants
to choose between different hypothetical bags of (unknown) types of candies. The purpose of these
questions is to understand whether children abide by the diversification paradigm in the simplest
choice scenario not involving any probabilities or explicit gambles. An element of uncertainty is added
by not revealing the specific types of candies. In Q1, the children were asked to choose between two
hypothetical bags, each containing four candies, where the candies in the first bag were all of the
same type, and the candies in the second bag contained two different types, two candies of each type.
Letting n denote the number of different types of candy in each choice, Q1 hence looked into whether
diversity (number of alternatives n = 2) is preferred over similarity (n = 1). Question Q2 generalizes
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question Q1 by varying n between 1 and 4 and the allocation α to each candy type between 25%
and 100%. Here, the choice is between four bags of several unknown candies: the first bag contained
four candies of the same type (n = 1 and α = 100%); the second bag contained two different types
of candies, two of each type (n = 2, α1 = 50% and α2 = 50%); the third bag again contained two
different types of candies but three of one type and one of a second type (n = 2, α1 = 75% and
α2 = 25%); and the fourth bag contained four candies, all of different types (i.e., n = 4, αi = 25%
for i = 1, . . . , 4). The next two questions, Q3 and Q4, asked the children to allocate ten hypothetical
coupons to two different types of candies, where in Q3 both candy types were unknown, and in Q4 one
type of candy was unknown and the second type was their favourite candy type. Here, the allocation
problem is more explicit. Our goal in Q3 and Q4 was to elicit the weights assigned to each candy type
and to explore whether information availability affects the chosen allocation. An overview of the four
questions making up Part 1 of the experiment can be found in Table 1.
Table 1: Questions in Part 1 of the experiment. The table summarizes the four questions Q1–Q4
asked to participants in the first part of the experiment. Questions Q1 and Q2 were choice tasks, where
participants had to choose between 2 and 4 different choice alternatives, respectively. Questions Q3 and
Q4 were elementary portfolio allocation problems, where participants were asked to allocate 10 hypothetical
coupons between two different choice alternatives.
Question Problem Choice alternatives
Q1 choice A: 4 candies, all of type 1
between B: 4 candies, two of type 1 and two of type 2
Q2 choice A: 4 candies, all of type 1
between B: 4 candies, two of type 1 and two of type 2
C: 4 candies, one of type 1, and three of type 2
D: 4 candies, one of type 1, one of type 2, one of type 3, and one of type 4
Q3 allocation A: candy type 1
between B: candy type 2
Q4 allocation A: candy type 1
between B: favourite candy type
Part 2. The second part of the experiment involved a sequence of gambles, which we refer to as
games G1–G7. These games aim to replicate a portfolio choice problem under risk and uncertainty
and to elicit children’s risk attitudes and diversification preferences. To implement gambles for young
children, a variety of simple instruments have been suggested and used in the literature, such as
the spinner wheel task (Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund 2001, Huber and Huber 1987, Reyna
and Ellis 1994), drawing cards from a deck (Marks 1951), or the use of safe versus disaster switches
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(Slovic 1966). We have chosen to implement gambles in terms of rolling dice for two main reasons.
First, the majority of children at primary school age (6 to 12 years old) have been previously exposed to
board or card games involving dice, and hence the concept of an uncertain outcome based on the result
of rolling a die was familiar to them. Second, in terms of experimental implementation, generating
different yet simple payoff distributions with specific correlation structures using dice did not require
any sophisticated infrastructure nor the necessity to instruct participants on how to understand them.
The goal of the first game G1 was to allow children to familiarize themselves with the type of
dice-rolling games in the remainder of the experiment. In G1, the children were asked to choose
between either receiving a coupon and keeping it for sure (to be exchanged for candy later on), or
to play a game, which involved picking a colour (blue or red) and rolling a fair die with three sides
coloured in blue and three sides coloured in red. If the game was played and the die landed on the
colour that was picked, the participant received two coupons in return, otherwise he/she received
nothing. Because the expected payoffs of both playing and not playing the game are identical, risk
averse children would, in theory, keep the coupon and not play the game, while risk seeking children
would play the game instead. As G1 was designed as a “warm-up” round, it was not rewarded in the
experiment and will not be evaluated in this paper.
The next sequence of four games (G2–G5) were designed to elicit children’s diversification pref-
erences. In each game, we asked the children to allocate 10 coupons to the colours red or blue on a
6-sided die whose sides were each coloured in either red or blue. In G2, the die had four blue and two
red sides; in G3 we used a fair die with three sides in each colour; in G4 we did not tell the children
the colour distribution on the die; and in G5 we used an unfair die with five blue sides and one red
side. We then rolled the die and the children received the amount of coupons corresponding to their
chosen allocation to the winning colour. These games replicate an allocation problem between two
risky assets with perfect negative correlation and identical volatilities, and we varied the expected
payoffs of the two assets by using different dice. As discussed in Section 2, in games G2 and G5, the
mean-variance decision maker will always allocate more coupons to the asset with higher expected
payoff. In game G3, the naive diversification strategy is always optimal for the mean-variance decision
maker. In game G4, participants faced uncertainty about the payoff distribution. Assuming the prior
that two assets should be equally ranked, the naive diversification strategy would be optimal for the
mean-variance decision maker.
The next game (G6) was designed to elicit children’s risk attitudes. The children were given the
option of choosing how many of the 10 coupons they would like to keep for sure and how many
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they would like to allocate to the colours red or blue on a fair 6-sided die with three sides in each
colour. They were rewarded twice the amount of coupons allocated to the winning colour. Because
the expected payoff is independent from the chosen allocation, risk aversion is equivalent to choosing a
risk-free allocation. This can be achieved by keeping some or all coupons for sure and equally splitting
the rest between the two colours.
Finally, the problem of allocating coupons to two equally distributed risky gambles with zero
correlation is addressed in G7. Here, the children were asked to assign 10 coupons to two different fair
dice, each with three blue and three red sides. Both dice were rolled simultaneously, and the allocated
coupons were paid off for each die when the colour red appeared, otherwise the participant received
nothing. As discussed in Section 2, in game G7 the naive diversification strategy is always optimal
for the mean-variance decision maker.
An overview of the games in Part 2 of the experiment can be found in Table 2.
Table 2: Games in part 2 of the experiment. The table summarizes the seven games G1–G7 played
with the participants in the second part of the experiment. Game G1 was a warm-up choice task, while games
G2-G7 were portfolio allocation problems with risky (G2, G3, G5, G6, G7) or uncertain (G4) payoffs. The
last columns in the table report the correlations between the choice alternatives, which were ether -1 or 0.
Game Problem Choice alternatives Correlation ρ
G1 choice A1: 1 with 100% probability
between B1: 2 with 50% probability and 0 with 50% probability
G2 allocation A2: 1 with 66.66% probability and 0 with 33.34% probability ρ(A2, B2) = −1
between B2: 1 with 33.34% probability and 0 with 66.66% probability
G3 allocation A3: 1 with 50% probability and 0 with 50% probability ρ(A3, B3) = −1
between B3: 1 with 50% probability and 0 with 50% probability
G4 allocation A4: 1 or 0 with unknown probabilities ρ(A4, B4) = −1
between B4: 1 or 0 with unknown probabilities
G5 allocation A5: 1 with 83.33% probability and 0 with 16.67% probability ρ(A5, B5) = −1
between B5: 1 with 16.67% probability and 0 with 83.33% probability
G6 allocation A6: 1 with 100% probability ρ(A6, B6) = 0
between B6: 2 with 50% probability and 0 with 50% probability ρ(A6, C6) = 0
C6: 2 with 50% probability and 0 with 50% probability ρ(B6, C6) = −1
G7 allocation A7: 1 with 50% probability and 0 with 50% probability ρ(A7, B7) = 0
between B7: 1 with 50% probability and 0 with 50% probability
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4.2 Motivating questions and hypotheses
Our experiments were designed to address the following three questions.
Is variety preferred to similarity? Variety is the proverbial spice of life. Preference for variety
is well-documented and considered a “virtually universal law of human (and animal) preferences”
(Middleton 1987). Given the vast empirical evidence on preference for variety, especially when faced
with choice among consumption goods, Part 1 of the experiment consisting of hypothetical choices
addresses the question of whether children prefer variety in consumption over similarity. In questions
Q1 and Q2, which ask children to choose between bags containing different types of unknown candies,
we hypothesize that the majority of participants prefer bags with larger variety of candies compared
to bags with lower variety of candies. Letting pB and pD denote the percentage of children choosing
the two variety maximizing alternatives B and D in questions Q1 and Q2, respectively (see Table 1),
we thus test the following two hypotheses:
H1: pB > 0.5 in Q1
H2: pD > 0.5 in Q2
Similarly, in questions Q3 and Q4, which ask the children to allocate 10 coupons to two different types
of candy, we hypothesize that the majority of children allocate a strictly positive amount of coupons
to each available option, even when one of these alternatives is described as their favourite type of
candy. Letting αA denote the percentage of coupons allocated to option A in questions Q3 and Q4
(see Table 1), we therefore test the following hypothesis:
H3: αA > 0 and 1− αA > 0 in Q3 and Q4
Is there a relationship between diversification and risk aversion? As discussed in Section 2,
under EUT, preference for diversification is equivalent to risk aversion. However, this equivalence fails
to hold in other models. To our knowledge, the relationship between risk attitude and diversification
has not been investigated empirically or experimentally before. Moreover, in games G2 and G5, where
the requested colour allocation is to unfair dice, optimal mean-variance allocations monotonically
converge to equal weights when risk aversion increases. Based on the idea that diversifying behavior
is an intrinsic trait, we contend that diversification is a general model-independent phenomenon and
can be observed regardless of the decision maker’s risk attitude. In particular, when the underlying
alternatives are equivalent or unknown, as is the case in games G3, G4 and G7, children’s diversification
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behaviour should be comparable among risk attitudes. On the other hand, following the relationship
between risk aversion and diversification underlying EUT and mean-variance portfolio choice, we
test whether children’s diversification behaviour differs in games G2 and G5 depending on their risk
attitudes. Here, we test whether risk seekers allocate a higher proportion to the choice alternative
with higher expected return, thus ending up with riskier portfolios compared to risk averters. Let
D denote a measure of dispersion of participants’ allocations. This measure assigns nonnegative real
numbers to different allocations, with its minimum equal to zero if all allocation weights are equal and
with increasing values as the allocations become more diverse. Typical examples of such measures in
the context of asset allocation are the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Hirschman 1964) and the
Gini coefficient (Gini 1921). We then test the following two hypotheses:
H4: Daverter = Dseeker in games G3, G4, G7
H5: Daverter < Dseeker in games G2 and G5
Are children always naive diversifiers? Given the view that the naive diversification paradigm
is a simple intuitive rule of thumb, our final question asks whether children are naive diversifiers and, if
not, we ask what might drive their chosen allocation. Recall that mean-variance decision makers apply
naive diversification when the available choice alternatives have similar characteristics. Moreover,
the principle of insufficient reason implies that naive diversification is used when no information
on available choice alternatives is given to decision makers. In this case, naive diversification can be
viewed as a consequence of the noninformative prior that available options have similar characteristics.
Therefore, we hypothesize that naive diversification is observed in games G3, G4, and G7, where the
alternatives are either equivalent or unknown. Letting αAi denote the percentage of coupons allocated
to option Ai, for i = 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 in games Gi, respectively, we thus test the following hypothesis:
H6: αAi = 50% for i = 3, 4, 7
Whether or not children apply the naive diversification heuristic even when faced with alternatives
that are not equivalent in terms of their risk/payoff profile, is tested in the final hypothesis H7:
H7: αAi > 50% for i = 2, 5
Hypothesis H7 essentially tests whether the chosen allocations depart from naive diversification in the
two games G2 and G5, where the choice alternative A2 (respectively A5) dominates choice alternative
B2 (respectively B5). Given the simple design of the games in terms of coloured dice and the evi-
dence that children, even as young as kindergarten age, exhibit a level of probabilistic sophistication
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(Schlottmann 2001), it seems plausible to expect children to deviate from naive diversification and
assign more coupons to the die colour that has a higher chance of winning.
4.3 Subjects, reward structure and procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Swiss International School (SIS) Winterthur, a private bilin-
gual (German/English) elementary school located in Winterthur, Switzerland. The experiment was
approved by the principal headmaster of the school and was run during regular school hours. It
was described to the children and supervising teachers as being part of a scientific research project
that studies decision making in children, without revealing the details or purpose. In particular, any
terminology relating to financial decisions, diversification, portfolios or investments were never used.
All students attending school on the day of the experiment participated. There were a total of 76
participants, 43 female and 33 male children, spanning Grades 1 through 6 of the primary school
years: 11 in Grade 1, 17 in Grade 2, 14 in Grade 3, 13 in Grade 4, 10 in Grade 5, and 11 in Grade 6.
Both gender and grade were recorded for each child. We did not record individual ages, but children
in Switzerland attending first grade are about 6 to 7 years old, and sixth graders are about 11 to
12 years old. The anonymity of the children was preserved by not asking them to write down their
names. To be able to distribute rewards at the end of the experiment, we assigned a number to each
child, which we asked them to record on their questionnaire packet.
Two experiment sessions were held to divide up the subject pool into Grades 1 through 3 followed
by Grades 4 through 6. Dividing the participants this way simplified the experiment procedure, since
the number of children attending each session was lower (42 and 34, respectively) and thus their
supervision was practically simplified. Moreover, we expected the session with younger children of
Grades 1-3 to last longer than for children in Grades 4-6. In each session, the participants were seated
in a large hall, along with four supervising teachers, the school principal, and ourselves, who were the
experiment leaders and instructors. Children were requested not to talk to their classmates during
the experiment and to silently raise their hand in order to ask clarifying questions to the supervising
teachers or the experiment leaders. The participants were given a stapled packet of papers, with each
page containing one question or game. Each question and game was explained carefully one at a time.
The participants then filled in their choices and the following question or game was read out and
explained next. The outcome of the dice rolling games were only revealed to the children at the end
of the experiment session. This helped avoid cheating incidents if the outcome of a game were to be
displayed. To avoid satiation, the children were told that only one game (excluding G1) was going to
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Table 3: Results questions Q1 and Q2. The tables displays the results of questions Q1 and Q2. Columns
2-7 report the percentage pX (%) of participants choosing options X = A,B and X = A,B,C,D in questions
Q1 and Q2, respectively. In question Q1, A has 4 candies, all of type 1, while B has 4 candies, two of type 1
and two of type 2. In question Q2, A has 4 candies, all of type 1, B has 4 candies, two of type 1 and two of
type 2, C has 4 candies, one of type 1 and three of type 2, and D has 4 candies, one of type 1, one of type
2, one of type 3, and one of type 4.
Q1 Q2
pA pB pA pB pC pD
Overall 5.3 94.7 1.3 2.6 2.6 93.4
Female 4.7 95.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 97.7
Male 6.1 93.9 0.0 6.1 6.1 87.8
Grade 1 18.2 81.9 9.2 0.0 0.0 90.9
Grade 2 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Grade 3 7.1 92.9 0.0 7.2 0.0 93.9
Grade 4 7.7 92.3 0.0 0.0 15.4 84.6
Grade 5 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Grade 6 0.0 100.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 90.9
be rewarded by picking it at random using a dice numbered accordingly at the end of the experiment.
The children who won some coupons could exchange them for the corresponding number of candies
(m&m’s or gummy bears) at the end of the experiment. Overall, the children were motivated by the
idea of playing games that could lead to consuming these popular items.
5 Results and discussion
Variety over similarity. Table 3 reports participants’ answers to questions Q1 and Q2, which
required a choice between bags of unknown types of candies. Table 4 shows means and medians of the
chosen allocations in questions Q3 and Q4, which asked children to assign 10 hypothetical coupons
to two different types of candies, where both types were unknown in Q3 and one type was known to
be their favourite candy in Q3. Table 4 also displays test results for the additional hypothesis that
chosen allocations in Q3 and Q4 correspond to naive diversification.
The following conclusions arise from the results of these tables. There is overall a clear preference
for variety over similarity. In choosing between bags with unknown types of candy, the large majority
of children prefer the bag with the biggest variety (94.7% chose the bag with two different types
of candies in Q1, supporting hypothesis H1, and 93.4% chose the bag with four different types of
candies in Q2, thus supporting hypothesis H2). Similarly, the results of the allocation questions Q3
and Q4 show that variety is strongly preferred to similarity. In Q3 the median allocation to candy
18
Table 4: Results questions Q3 and Q4. The table summarizes the results of questions Q3 and Q4.
Columns 2-3 report the percentage allocation αA to option A in questions Q3 and Q4, respectively. In
question Q3, there are two options, A and B, where option A is a candy of type 1, while option B is a candy
of type 2. In question Q4, there are two options A and B, where A is a candy of type 1, while B is the
favourite candy. We applied the two-sided Wilcoxon rank test to test the null hypothesis that the average
allocation αA to lottery A corresponds to 50% (naive diversification), against the alternative that it differs
from this allocation. The p-values are reported with rejections at 5% confidence level indicated by *, at 1%
confidence level indicated by **, and at 0.1% confidence level indicated by ***. We used the Bonferroni
correction for multiple testing in order to compute p-values.







































type 1 was 50% and the hypothesis of equal weights among existing options cannot be rejected, thus
supporting hypothesis H3. In question Q4, even though one of the two types of candy is described
as being the favourite candy type, the median allocation to the unknown candy type is still 20%.
By introducing a type of candy known to be their favourite, children clearly used this information in
their allocation decisions, and thus the naive diversification hypothesis can be rejected. However, a
majority of children (61 out of 76 participants) nevertheless prefer some degree of variety to similarity
by not allocating all of their coupons to their favourite candy. All results are consistent across gender
and age.
Note that this part of the experiment does not elicit the underlying drivers of the children’s
preference for variety. One rationale for this evident diversification preference is simply that variety is
chosen for the sake of variety, which is consistent with research on variety across consumption goods.
The results of question Q4, in particular, support this idea. A second interpretation arises based on
the fact that the underlying alternatives are unknown, as the types of candy were not revealed. By
adding this element of uncertainty, one may be inclined to conclude that children are regret averse or
(perhaps subconsciously) diversifying to hedge against choosing too much of a candy type that they
may end up not liking. However, there is no clear experimental evidence supporting one behavioral
driver over another.
Diversification and risk aversion. To determine children’s risk attitudes we used their alloca-
tions in game G6, which essentially represents an allocation task between a risk-free asset (keeping
coupons) and a risky asset (playing the dice rolling game). Because in game G6 the expected payoff
is independent from the allocation of the coupons, risk averse children are those choosing the risk-free
payoff, while risk seekers are those taking on some level of risk. According to this classification, we
divided participants into risk averters (46 children) and risk seekers (30 children) and analyzed their
respective diversification behaviour. Note that, by design of the game, risk averters are those keeping
some or all coupons for sure and equally splitting the remainder between the two colours on the fair
die. Out of the 46 risk averse children, 20 kept all of their 10 coupons, whereas the remaining 26
kept some coupons and split the rest equally between blue and red. Technically, this means that
the latter risk averse group diversify, whereas the former concentrate, with both groups achieving the
same certain return of 10 coupons. Diversification may thus not have been applied for risk mitigation
purposes, but rather for the sake of diversity, or “for the fun of it.” Noteworthy, however, is the subtle
idea that children may be risk averse regardless of their diversification preferences.
Tables 5 and 6 report our main results on the relation between diversification and risk attitudes.
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The following observations emerge. First, Table 5 shows that only in games G2 and G5, in which
unfair dice were used, we can reject the hypothesis that risk averters and risk seekers choose similar
allocations (we exclude game G6 because this is used to classify children’s risk attitudes). Indeed in
these two games, risk seekers generally allocate more to the choice alternatives with higher expected
payoffs than their risk averse counterparts (median differences are plus 10% and plus 20% in games
G2 and G5, respectively) and thus end up with riskier portfolios. The results in Table 6 based on
applying the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) and the Gini measure of inequality to the allocation
weights confirm that in games G2 and G5 risk averters choose allocations with lower dispersion and
hence closer to equality compared to risk seekers. This supports hypothesis H5. Overall, we conclude
that whereas the large majority of children diversify to some extent in games G2 and G5, there is a
significant relationship between their allocations to the alternative with higher expected payoff and
their risk attitudes.
Next, we analyze the relationship between risk attitude and naive diversification in the three
games in which the choice alternatives were either equivalent (games G3 and G7) or unknown (game
G4). Table 5 shows that naive diversification cannot be rejected for both risk averters and risk
seekers in these three games. We conclude that, when faced with equivalent or unknown alternatives,
children allocate their coupons according to the naive diversification heuristic independent of their
risk attitudes. This supports hypothesis H4.
We finally look into the role of probabilities in children’s decision making and investigate whether
these might be driving the differing allocations of risk averters and risk seekers. Our focus is now on
games G2, G3 and G5, which are identical in design and differ only in the probabilities assigned to
the two colours. In particular, we test whether children use probability matching, a decision strategy
in which allocations are proportional to the probability of obtaining a strictly positive payoff in the
corresponding choice alternatives. The probability matching strategy is of behavioral interest because,
on one hand, it is frequently employed by human subjects in decision and classification studies (see
for example Duda, Hart, and Stork 2001, Shanks, Tunney, and McCarthy 2002), and on the other
hand, it would imply a level of probabilistic sophistication in the children. Probability matching
implies allocations of 66.7%, 50%, and 83.3% to choices A2, A3 and A5 in games G2, G3, and G5,
respectively. Table 7 displays the mean and median deviations from probability matched strategies
in these three games. We can reject probability matching for risk averters in games G2 and G5, in
which the die probabilities are not symmetric. Risk averse children are in fact generally closer in their
allocations to naive diversification than to probability matching. The allocations of risk seekers, on
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Table 5: Results for different risk attitudes and tests for naive diversification. The table shows
mean and median allocations αAi to options Ai in games G2 to G7 for different risk attitudes, with risk
attitude classification based on the outcome of game G6. The table also shows test results for the hypothesis
that participants used naive diversification strategies in games G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, and G7. We applied
one-side Wilcoxon rank test to test the null hypothesis that the mean allocation to lottery Ai in game Gi
corresponds to 50% (naive diversification), against the alternative that it is strictly greater. The p-values are
reported with rejections at 5% confidence level indicated by *, at 1% confidence level indicated by **, and
at 0.1% confidence level indicated by ***. We used the Bonferroni correction for multiple testing in order to
compute p-values.
Allocation αAi to choice Ai (%)
G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7
Risk averse (46)
Mean 59.3 53.5 53.9 68.7 71.3 47.8
Median 50.0 50.0 50.0 70.0 80.0 50.0
p-value (0.001)*** (0.151) (0.389) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.308)
Risk seeking (30)
Mean 66.7 50.0 52.3 80.3 50.0 46.0
Median 60.0 50.0 50.0 90.0 50.0 50.0
p-value (0.000)*** (1.000) (0.472) (0.000)** (0.009)** (0.321)
Mean difference -7.3 3.5 1.6 -11.6 21.3 1.8
Median difference -10.0 0.0 0.0 -20.0 30.0 0.0
p-value (0.038)* (0.237) (0.418) (0.014)** - (0.651)
the other hand, are very close to those of the corresponding probability matching strategies in games
G2 and G5, suggesting that risk seeking children may have analyzed probabilities of outcome and used
this information to match their allocations. Because in game G3, which used a fair die, probability
matching coincides with naive diversification, it cannot be rejected for both risk averters and risk
seekers, as here their allocations are close to naive diversification.
Naive diversification. So far, we have only analyzed the naive diversification heuristic in relation
to risk attitude. We next address the question of whether children are applying this simple rule of
thumb (independent of risk attitude) across all games. Table 8 reports the test results for hypotheses
H6 (which conjectures that naive diversification is observed when choice alternatives are equivalent or
unknown, as in G3, G4, and G7) and H7 (which tests whether children depart from naive diversification
when choice alternatives are not equivalent, as in G2 and G5). We observe that naive diversification
is rejected for games G2 and G5, conforming with our earlier results relating naive diversification
to risk attitudes. This observation is also consistent across gender. However, for game G2, naive
diversification cannot be rejected at the level of grades 1,2,4, and 5 (also because of small samples),
while for game G5 the only exception is Grade 4. In games G3, G4, and G7, naive diversification
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Table 6: Inequality among asset weights versus risk attitudes. The table reports results on the
inequality among asset weights in games G2 to G7. As statistical dispersion measures of inequality, we
use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the Gini Index. The Herfindahl-Hirschman and the Gini indices









2n , respectively. In both cases, naive diversification implies thatHHI andG are identically zero.
We also report theoretical values of HHI and G, when probability matching or mean-variance strategy with
given levels or risk aversion are applied. We applied one-side Wilcoxon rank test to test the null hypothesis
that HHI and G are equal under risk aversion and under risk seeking behaviour, against the alternative
that HHI and G are higher under risk seeking behavior. The p-values are reported with rejections at 5%
confidence level indicated by *, at 1% confidence level indicated by **, and at 0.1% confidence level indicated
by ***.
G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7
HHI
Overall 0.20 0.11 0.09 0.44 0.49 0.09
Risk averse 0.17 0.10 0.05 0.33 0.57 0.05
Risk seeking 0.26 0.11 0.15 0.61 0.37 0.16
p-value (0.020)* (0.355) (0.084) (0.002)** (0.886) (0.166)
Prob. matched 0.11 0.00 - 0.44 - -
Mean-variance optimal
γ = 2 0.14 0.00 - 1.44 - 0.00
γ = 3 0.06 0.00 - 0.64 - 0.00
γ = 10 0.01 0.00 - 0.06 - 0.00
Gini
Overall 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.27 0.61 0.06
Risk averse 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.22 0.68 0.04
Risk seeking 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.35 0.49 0.09
(0.020)* (0.355) (0.084) (0.002)** 0.993 (0.166)
Prob. matched 0.17 0.00 - 0.33 - -
Mean-variance optimal
γ = 2 0.07 0.00 - 0.77 - 0.00
γ = 3 0.03 0.00 - 0.32 - 0.00
γ = 10 0.01 0.00 - 0.03 - 0.00
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Table 7: Test results for probability matching. The table shows mean and median deviations from
probability matching (probability of payoff 1 in option Ai) of allocations αAi to options Ai in games G2, G3
and G5. The table also shows test results for the hypothesis that participants used probability matching in
games G2, G3, and G5. We applied two-sided Wilcoxon rank test to test the null hypothesis that the average
allocation to lottery Ai in game Gi corresponds to the probability of payoff 1 (probability matching), against
the alternative that it differs. The p-values are reported with rejections at 5% confidence level indicated by
*, at 1% confidence level indicated by **, and at 0.1% confidence level indicated by ***. We also report the
results for different risk attitudes, which are defined based on game G6. We used the Bonferroni correction
for multiple testing in order to compute p-values.
Deviation of αAi from prob. matching (%)
G2 G3 G5
All
Mean deviation -4.4 2.1 -10.0
Median deviation -11.7 0.0 -3.3
(0.010)** (0.151) (0.004)**
Risk averse
Mean deviation -7.3 3.5 -14.6
Median deviation -16.7 0.0 -13.3
(0.010)** (0.301) ( 0.000)***
Risk seeking
Mean deviation -2.4 -0.6 -7.2
Median deviation -6.7 0.0 -3.3
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
24
cannot be rejected for all genders and grades.
Overall, the results indicate that naive diversification is generally chosen as an allocation strategy
when alternatives are equivalent or unknown, thus supporting hypothesis H6. However, when one
choice alternative is clearly superior, naive diversification is not applied. This is the case in game
G5, where both available alternatives have the same volatility, but choice alternative A5 have higher
expected payoffs.
These findings point to some level of probabilistic and financial sophistication, as children seem to
be able to evaluate the underlying alternatives available to them in terms of their risk-payoff profile,
and make a decision accordingly. So far, some experimental research on adults’ portfolio choice has
reached the conclusion that people are “naive” when it comes to asset allocation, as they equally
weight their options regardless of what these options are. Clearly, the levels of sophistication of
experiments involving choice between gambles in terms of simple dice-rolling games is significantly
lower than those involving choice between real assets. However, we believe that the relative difficulty
level when taking cognitive sophistication into account is comparable.
6 Concluding remarks
The notion of diversification is paramount, both as a choice heuristic and as a practical method-
ology for financial investment. However, the views of what constitutes reasonable diversification in
the disciplines of finance and economic theory differ and tend to be exogenously given. Traditional
diversification paradigms are consistently violated in practice, and anomalous diversifying behavior
has been widely documented in empirical and experimental research.
Taking a behavioral viewpoint, we contend that diversification is an independent driving force of
behavior that is not necessarily a consequence of knowledge of financial models, and — at least partly
— an intrinsic preference with deep developmental roots. By testing whether young children, whose
intuition plays a large role in their decision making and who have not (yet) received financial literacy
or economic theory training, would indeed diversify when faced with a choice among several alterna-
tives, we certainly do not prove our hypothesis, but we are contributing to the evidence supporting
it. The central premise of this paper is that children do indeed possess an arguably refined sense
for the potential upside of diversifying. Our findings suggest that (i) children diversify when faced
with a choice of consumption goods; (ii) they are “naive” in their allocations only when the naive
diversification is actually theoretically optimal; (iii) they are driven by a sophisticated understanding
of probabilities when the given choice alternatives differ in their outcome probabilities; and (iv) that
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Table 8: Results for games G1 to G7 and tests for naive diversification. The table shows mean and
median allocations αAi to options Ai in games G2 to G7. The table also shows test results for the hypothesis
that participants used naive diversification strategies in games G2 to G7. We applied one-side Wilcoxon rank
test to test the null hypothesis that the mean allocation to lottery Ai in game Gi corresponds to 50% (naive
diversification), against the alternative that it is strictly greater. The p-values are reported with rejections
at 5% confidence level indicated by *, at 1% confidence level indicated by **, and at 0.1% confidence level
indicated by ***. We also report theoretical values of αAi, when naive diversification, probability matching
or mean-variance strategy with given levels or risk aversion are applied. We used the Bonferroni correction
for multiple testing in order to compute p-values.
Allocation αAi to choice Ai (%)
G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7
All (76)
Mean 62.5 52.1 53.3 73.3 62.9 52.9
Median 55.0 50.0 50.0 80.0 65.0 50.0
p-value (0.000)*** (0.151) (0.026)* (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.067)
Female (43)
Mean 56.5 49.1 54.4 69.5 66.7 48.8
Median 50.0 50.0 50.0 70.0 70.0 50.0
p-value (0.000)*** (1.000) (0.370) (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.588)
Male (33)
Mean 69.7 56.1 51.8 78.2 57.9 44.8
Median 70.0 50.0 50.0 90.0 60.0 50.0
p-value (0.000)*** (0.092) (0.527) (0.000)*** (0.002)** (0.220)
Grade 1 (11)
Mean 57.3 59.1 61.8 80.0 86.4 38.2
Median 50.0 50.0 50.0 100.0 90.0 50.0
p-value (0.721) (0.811) (0.410) (0.038)* (0.010)** (0.592)
Grade 2 (17)
Mean 58.2 51.2 52.4 64.7 70.6 50.0
Median 50.0 50.0 50.0 60.0 100.0 50.0
(0.170) (1.000) (0.796) (0.089)* (0.015)* (1.000)
Grade 3 (14)
Mean 75.7 57.9 54.3 92.9 44.3 45.7
Median 80.0 50.0 50.0 100.0 35.0 50.0
p-value (0.018)* (0.599) (1.000) (0.002)** (1.000) (1.000)
Grade 4 (13)
Mean 59.2 47.7 46.9 56.9 60.8 48.5
Median 50.0 50.0 50.0 60.0 60.0 50.0
p-value (0.175) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.012)* (1.000)
Grade 5 (10)
Mean 60.0 51.0 51.0 75.0 64.0 49.0
Median 50.0 50.0 50.0 80.0 55.0 50.0
p-value (0.293) (1.000) (1.000) (0.041)* (0.017)* (1.000)
Grade 6 (11)
Mean 61.8 45.5 54.5 72.7 52.7 50.0
Median 60.0 50.0 50.0 80.0 50.0 50.0
p-value (0.031)* (1.000) (1.000) (0.024)* (0.106) (1.000)
Theory
Naive 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 33.3 50.0
Prob. matched 66.7 50.0 - 83.3 - -
Mean-variance optimal
γ = 2 68.8 50.0 - 110.0 - 50.0
γ = 3 62.3 50.0 - 90.0 - 50.0
γ = 10 53.8 50.0 - 62.0 - 50.0
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their risk attitudes affect their diversifying behavior only when one alternative is less risky than an-
other. We conclude by asking where this seemingly rational behavior is coming from and what can
be done with the knowledge of it.
Investigating the roots of decision making and behavioral preferences is an ongoing extensive
effort of behavioral and financial economists, psychologists, neuroscientists and evolutionary biologists.
One argument is that attitudes towards diversification may be the evolutionary product of natural
selection. Tendencies towards diversifying across gambles may thus have been hard-wired by the
evolutionary selection process. From an evolutionary biologist’s perspective, this hypothesis may not
come as a surprise, as the notion of diversification lies at the core of evolution and natural selection
(Darwin 1859). Moreover, the types of preferences that psychologists and behavioral economists
study, such as intertemporal choices, risk attitudes, selfishness and altruism, are also ubiquitous
in biology and behavioral ecology. Indeed, the desirability of considering the biological formation of
preferences has been strongly advocated by a number of economists, for example by Hirshleifer (1978).
Another prominent supporter of this investigation is Robson (1996, 2001a, 2001b) (see also Robson
and Samuelson 2009, Robson and Samuelson 2010), whose work promotes the idea that our attitudes
to gambles over commodities were hard-wired by the evolutionary process and therefore continue
to be exhibited today. Several other studies have yielded profound insights into the evolution of
economic preferences, ranging from risk attitudes to entrpreneurial traits to altruism (see for example
Karni and Schmeidler 1986, Hansson and Stuart 1990, Rogers 1994, Samuelson 2001, Curry 2001, Ok
and Vega-Redondo 2001, Schlesinger 2003, Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya 2007, Rayo and Becker 2007,
Lakshminarayanan, Chen, and Santos 2011, Galor and Michalopoulos 2012). Moreover, diversifying
behavior has received the attention of leading evolutionary biologists. Perhaps the most prominent is
the article by Real (1980), who shows that diversified behaviors will prove advantageous for almost
any expected evolutionary fitness. Other evolutionary writings touching upon diversification from a
behavioral viewpoint include Frank and Slatkin (1990), who show that bet-hedging is always favoured
when there are no associated costs, since it reduces the variance of a genotype’s average reproductive
success.
We thus argue that the extensive theoretical, experimental and empirical research dedicated to
diversification in economics and finance is too narrow to fully account for the cognitive foundations
of diversification preferences and their motivational causes. Considering the psychological, biological,
evolutionary, and neuroscientific roots of diversifying strategies can illuminate investigations into
the mechanisms supporting these behaviors. The results of our experiment support the idea that
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diversifying preferences are in some sense more elementary and fundamental to human behavior than
modern theory suggests. That said, it is important to point out that our paper does not address the
question of whether children’s diversification preferences are innate rather than acquired. The idea
that some of our behavioral characteristics are explained by our intrinsic nature, whilst others reflect
the influence of the environment is an ancient one. An investigation of this distinction would require
wide-ranging interdisciplinary research efforts and are beyond the scope of the experimental setup of
this paper.
Even if no clear view of the innateness of diversification is given, the suggestion that some amount
of our diversifying behavior has an intuitive, perhaps intrinsic component may have consequences for
how one can treat these diversification tendencies in practice. There are three angles to potential
implications. First, if a diversification bias such as the (naive) diversification heuristic has such an
elemental basis, this may lead us to believe that it will persist in a variety of settings, will be stable
across time, ages and cultures, and may endure even in the face of repeated financial disciplining. This
may constrain the potential for successful policy intervention. Second, understanding how deeply any
diversification related bias manifests itself may influence how financial economists should incorporate
it into more adequate models of individual financial decision making. Third, given that our experiment
indicates that children as young as primary school age display some level of gambling and financial
sophistication, whereas extensive modern research documents irrational investment behavior in adults,
one is inclined to ask why seemingly rational children develop into irrational adults when it comes
to financial decision making. Even though preferences and external factors do change over time, our
results indicate that children may be cognitively ready for financial literacy training in schools and
for exposure to financial decision making from their parents from a very young age, and that any
such formal training or exposure must remain consistent and appropriately structured all the way
into adulthood. Controlled experiments tracking choices of different groups of children into adulthood
based on the level of financial training received may provide more concrete insights and are the subject
of future experimental research.
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